Did Stalin “sleep” on June 22, 1941?

118

Whatever the year, on the eve of one of the most tragic dates of our history in some media and, especially on the Internet, the discussion on the topic: “But how could this have happened ?!” To our great regret, June 22, 1941 has been and remains a day for decades, around which almost the largest number of gossip, legends, dubious assumptions and absolutely crazy versions have been tricked.

But it’s high time to take a look at this day, and especially the events that preceded it, as impartially as possible, in order to at least try to weed out the seeds of truth, even if bitter, from the spitting of lies and fabrications.



About the origins of the myth


It just so happened that the colossal scale of the nationwide catastrophe that broke out on June 22, 1941, the endless horror of grief and disasters that befell the country, today "obscure" many details, without taking into account which to compose an objective picture of the events of that time, and, in particular, talk about their real prerequisites , is simply impossible. At the same time, during the Great Patriotic War, the terrible defeats of the first months of the war, the brutal collapse of the doctrine "to beat the enemy with little blood on its territory", had to be explained somehow - as to those who themselves found themselves in the thick of the bloody meat grinder of the nightmare summer of 41, so also to those who still had to take up arms and go to meet the enemy. To explain all the nuances and complexities of the situation (many of which belonged to the category of state secrets of the highest rank) to these people, for the most part, simple, ingenuous and far from the complex and intricate subtleties of militarypolitical intrigue, it was completely unacceptable and, in addition, useless. Hence, a simple and direct explanation, like a bayonet to a Mosin rifle, was born: "The enemy insidiously struck a blow to our peaceful country, which was not going to fight with anyone, and therefore the losses were so heavy - because of the surprise attack of the Nazis!"

Everyone somehow resigned themselves to such an explanation - all the more so that in the end, by the word and will of the Supreme Victory, it remained for us. However, the Twentieth Congress later struck, with which the vile orgy of anti-Stalinism began, and here the tragedy of June 22 fell on Khrushchev's lackeys very well. The great Leader who had gone to Eternity vied with each other for blaming him for “overslept”, “slapping” the Nazis and, in general, almost creating all the conditions for him with “mass repressions of the command staff” and “collapse of the army”. There were individuals who, in their schizophrenic zeal, came to the assertions that Hitler decided to go to war because Tukhachevsky and his comrades were leaning against the wall ...

After a while, with the end of the evil Khrushchevschina, the whistle dance with attempts to "hang" all the blame for June 22 against Stalin also subsided. Soviet historiography has actually returned to its original interpretation of "surprise." This turned out to be some kind of delusional split: on the one hand, in the USSR in the 40s everyone understood, they saw Nazism as an enemy, a clash with which was inevitable, they were preparing for war, they re-equipped the army, signed a pact with Ribbentrop in order to receive at least some postponements to prepare and push the borders to the West. On the other hand, in June 1941, an “unexpected and insidious attack”. In people who have at least some critical mentality, this caused an inevitable and severe cognitive dissonance. There was a feeling that immediately before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the leadership of the party, country, army and special services in the USSR was seized by some kind of collective madness or impotence. Which, however, then passed very quickly - otherwise we would never have won the war. And this does not happen ...

People who decide the fate of millions are either talented, or mediocre, or they know how to make the right decisions, or they are incapable of doing it. It turns out that until 1941 Stalin led the country to the future Victory with an iron hand. Then he "failed", and then again returned to his normal state - a great strategist and politician. Rave. However, during the years of unkind memory of "perestroika", the domestic liberal tribe returned again to the old song of the Bald Kukuruznik and his hangers-on, starting to blame Joseph Vissarionovich: he also "ruined intelligence" and "did not trust her", painting obscene messages on the reports resolution, and generally believed the Germans, like some, God forgive me, idiot. Then the possessed Rezun - "Suvorov" joined in and began to lie that Stalin was going to "take over Europe", but Hitler "outwitted" him - and that was all ... In the wretched heads of the liberoids there was "a solitaire", in their opinion, perfectly explaining everything. But these are not explanations, but bullshit.

Who will outstay whom, outwit whom


To a large extent, the fact that many of our compatriots took the shameful enemies of Rezun and his followers at face value was facilitated by mistakes made in the interpretation of the pre-war situation in Soviet times. Even, I would say, not mistakes, but quite conscious and gross fraud in this matter. Two things were instilled into all of us from the school bench: first, that the USSR was an exceptionally peace-loving country, only preparing for defense. Secondly, the fact that in addition to Hitlerite Germany and its “satellites” we had no enemies in Europe and the world. Solid future allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. But this does not correspond to the truth at all.

In order to put everything in its place, it is necessary to drop false prejudices and cliches, call a spade a spade. War for the USSR was absolutely inevitable - and starting from November 7, 1917. Or, if you like, from the autumn of 1922, which is considered the time of the end of the Civil War on our land. Adolf Schicklgruber wouldn’t get out of Munich’s pubs - he would have to fight with Poland, supported by Britain, France and the USA. Or with Japan, which would have had the same countries as allies. Am I talking nonsense ?! And who was going to get involved in the war with our country in 1940 on the side of Finland? Not the English with the French, who were already imposing plans for the bombing of Baku and amphibious landings? The capitalist countries, seeing the power of the USSR growing every year, were determined to destroy it. Hitler turned up - set him up: financial assistance, the Munich agreement, the lack of real action after the occupation of the Wehrmacht by Poland. Pitting Germany and Russia is the classic, favorite Anglo-Saxon geopolitical move. No - they would get down to business themselves.

The proof of Stalin's genius is that in 1941 our country found itself face to face with the military forces of Germany, Italy, Romania, Hungary and others, but still not with the combined armed forces of ALL Europe. Concluding the Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, Joseph Vissarionovich achieved what seemed impossible - he "turned" Hitler to the West, at the same time that London and Paris were pushing the Nazis to the East with all their might. But his undoubted mistake was that the consequences of this reversal were calculated incorrectly. Stalin quite reasonably hoped that the Wehrmacht, even if it was locked on our borders, would be at least two or three years later, pretty battered by battles with millions of European armies. And, perhaps, it will not even come to this at all - and even then the Red Liberation Army will put an end to this war, having finished what remains of the Nazi thugs and bringing freedom to the peoples occupied by them. So in the end did it happen? And what bad plan was that?

Yes ingenious! What the Supreme could not predict at all was that the “resistance” of German aggression would last in Europe for several hours, for several days, and for weeks. That the Nazis, replenished their arsenals with unused weapons against them, and the ranks with legions and entire divisions of foreign volunteers eager to participate in the "fight against Bolshevism", will come to us so early and even stronger than they were before 1940, and not bloodless and weakened . Well, what can you do - such a ridiculous and "shameful" war "that Hitler received in the West instead of the alleged bloody bath, the future author of the order" Not a Step Back! " I was simply not able to imagine. That is his whole mistake. Hitler did not predict on May 9, 1945 because he measured the Russians across Europeans. Stalin did not predict June 22, 1941 because he measured the Europeans in Russian ...

The pendulum is swinging ...


Those who are trying to argue that the military-political situation in Europe in 1941 was "unambiguous" either do not understand what they are talking about or lie deliberately. The war machine of the Third Reich could well move both East and West. On the one hand, Hitler’s remarks are widely known that before “sorting out” the USSR, it is necessary to “solve affairs” with Britain. On the other hand, all sane leaders in the USSR, including Stalin, remembered very well how in 1940 the Wehrmacht released from the seemingly deadly trap of Dunkirk more than three hundred thousand British, French and Belgians. Someone to this day is trying to talk about the "turbidity" or "eclipse" that suddenly found itself on the Führer, but the matter, of course, was different - Hitler made it clear to the British that he would prefer not to fight them to death.

Was the military alliance of Britain and Germany directed against the USSR impossible in 1941? And then why on the spot then on May 10 of this year in Scotland did Rudolf Hess, one of the most prominent figures of the Nazi party and the Third Reich, land? Why did the NKVD foreign intelligence record negotiations between the Germans and the British, secretly conducted in Stockholm and Spain? Everything could be, and London, like no other capital, was at that moment interested in the German attack on the USSR - for him it was a matter of survival. It was in such an environment that decisions were made and chances were evaluated. Did the Soviet secret services not see the danger? Yes, the letter-case "Zateya" for controlling the military threat emanating from the Third Reich was initiated by the NKVD intelligence at the end of 1940! And they worked on it with all zeal, you can rest assured.

Moreover - Stalin with all his might again tried to "deploy" the future enemy to the West! Through all possible channels, information on strengthening the Red Army, the USSR military industry, and its defense potential was intensely "merged" into Berlin. Hitler was warned: "Do not meddle, burn yourself!" It got to the point that the German military attaché in the Soviet Union was kindly organized an extremely informative “tour” of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, including the ones where the latest models of tanks and combat aircraft were produced. Absurd stupidity? No, the desire to prevent war at all costs. And by the way, this worked: the final decision on the attack on the USSR by Hitler was made, according to various sources, either 10, or even June 14, 1941. “Wait,” you say, “what about the Barbarossa plan that the Führer presented back in 1940 ?!” Well, you never know what they presented to him ... The development of detailed plans for conducting military operations against neighboring (and not only) states is exactly what the high ranks of the General Staff of any army of the world are supposed to do tirelessly.

Similar plans in Europe at one time had any self-respecting country. And practically - everyone is against everyone. To compose something like a “di irst column of marshiert” is one thing, and to give an order for an offensive is somewhat different. And far from everyone in the leadership of the Third Reich, both military and political, shared Hitler’s enthusiasm for the Eastern Campaign. People knew perfectly well that in the event of protracted military operations with the USSR, Germany would lose them inevitably (as it happened in the end). And only Corporal Schicklgruber, after brilliant blitzkriegs in the West, tightly got into his head that the Soviet Union was a “colossus with feet of clay” that would collapse under the very first blows of the “victorious Wehrmacht” and that the war would be over before the fall.

Abyss Spy Games


When today someone writes that “intelligence reports were lying in packs on Stalin’s table”, in which the day and almost an hour of the German attack on the USSR were exactly indicated, they are silent about one thing. The fact that at the other end of the Leader’s table lay, at least, the same thickness of a pile of undercover messages and reports, the authors of which claimed that there would be no invasion in any case - at least this year! And there were also a dozen and a half “exact dates” for the start of the war ... In addition to the “Zatea,” there was also the lettering “Black Bertha,” which carefully recorded all the efforts made by Britain and the USA to “push their heads together” as soon as possible USSR and Germany. Stalin is often reproached for almost “massacre”, which was arranged in foreign intelligence just before the Great Patriotic War. Yes, there were “purges”. However, those who complain about them, claiming that “the best reconnaissance personnel were destroyed”, for some reason do not mention what kind of personnel they were and that they had time to “work out” by that time.

The anger of the Leader fell upon Soviet intelligence after its representatives (for the most part, immigrants from the brainchild of Trotsky-the Comintern) committed not only a series of gross failures, but also a considerable number of betrayals were committed. Voluntary passage to the enemy’s side of such aces of the secret war as Alexander Orlov, Ignatius Reis, Walter Krivitsky, and at the same time high-ranking NKVD rank German Lyushkov, not only convincingly showed that not everything was successful in reconnaissance, but also dealt a severe blow to the activities of this structure . The payoff for the life of a scout who surrendered to the enemy is always served by the secrets of his colleagues' activities known to him - lists of agents, codes, codes, secret paths for "illegal immigrants" and the like. Yes, after surrendering all this to the defectors, neither Beria nor Stalin, in fact, could at all trust any of the representatives of the overseas residencies! Nobody could vouch that they were no longer taken under full control and did not drive the perfect “disu” to the Center.

Everything had to be checked, rechecked - and a hundred times, to establish again. The fact that Vladimir Dekanozov and Amayak Kobulov were in Berlin on the eve of World War II, one of the few people whom Lavrenty Pavlovich could completely trust, is not surprising. They also often utter completely unfounded accusations and reproaches - “slammed”, they say. Especially some "clever men" are sophisticated about Kobulov - he supposedly had "no experience," and behaved in Berlin "inappropriately," and "chatted too much." And most importantly, he sent Stalin the misinformation that the agent supplied him with, which was the "decoy duck" of the Gestapo. There is only one objection to this - if Kobulov and Dekanozov had at least a small fraction of real blame for June 22, they would have simply been executed upon their return to the USSR. However, nothing like this happened - Kobulov turned out to be the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in Uzbekistan, then was returned to Moscow to rather big posts, Dekanozov did not have a great career, however, he was not repressed. The Khrushchev gang dealt with both in the terrible 1953, as with Beria’s comrades-in-arms.

Regarding Kobulov again, serious researchers suggest that his actions in Berlin in 1941 were part of some very large and complex game that was personally played by Beria and Stalin, and his “talkativeness” was no more than another channel “ plum ”the information they need. However, now it is hardly possible to establish the truth. But one can at least refute the most ridiculous rumors - like the one that Stalin and Beria personally imposed on the reports of scouts warning about the war, resolutions in which through the word there was selective swearing or proposals "to erase into gallery dust." As far as I know, the Leader’s written obscene resolutions have not been preserved at all (I’ll ask you not to offer explicit fakes!), This also applies to Lavrenty Pavlovich. No, both fully possessed the "sacred" depths of the great Russian language and put them into practice. But to write matyuki on documents, like a schoolboy on a fence? Wrong people. As for the "camp dust" ... It touches when gentlemen liberals try to attribute to their characters they hate not only their wretched "thinking", but also their own vocabulary.

In the spring and summer of 1941, a super-intense intelligence war was fought, in which both perfectly prepared misinformation and provocations, various kinds of ingenious combinations, many of which were prepared for years, were used! I will recall to the doubters about the so-called "Mechelen incident", during which in 1940 in the hands of the Belgians "suddenly" was a detailed operational plan of the Wehrmacht’s Western campaign. The Allies breathed a sigh of relief - this is exactly what they expected. That's just the Germans hit in a completely different way. Some people believe that the loss of "secret documents" just forced Hitler to accept Manstein’s proposals, the implementation of which led to the instant defeat of Belgium, Holland, France and the British expeditionary force. I think it was a little different - the Germans deliberately slipped the “bullshit” to the enemy, and he pecked at it. So could a year later, Stalin believe each of the reports received - especially in light of the fact that half of them contradicted one another? Preparations for the war were carried out, moreover, consistently and more intensively.

It has long been proven - an order from Moscow to deploy troops in combat formations did not even go to the okrugs on June 20-21, but even earlier. Another thing is that in some places he was ignored, and in some cases intentionally. On June 22, 1941, I wrote in great detail about the topic of betrayal in the highest military echelons of the Red Army ... On June 17, 1941, nobody prevented the Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Kuznetsov from bringing the fleet into full combat readiness. As for the NKVD, one of the few sources that I personally believe to be reliable in this matter is Pavel Sudoplatov, who did not sing to Stalin and Beria but never drenched them with mud. According to his recollections, he received an order from Lavrenty Pavlovich to prepare saboteurs for action in the conditions of war, on June 1941. The transfer of troops from Siberia to the western borders of the USSR began in the spring of XNUMX. The failures of the Red Army and the bloody battles of XNUMX were not due to the fact that someone “overslept” something, but to completely different moments. But this is a slightly different topic ...
118 comments
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  1. Winnie
    Winnie
    -4
    20 June 2020 10: 35
    The failures of the Red Army and the bloody battles of 1941 were not due to the fact that someone “overslept” something, but to completely different moments.

    One of the reasons for the failure of the spacecraft at the beginning of the war is the cleansing of the command staff from the "white bone", which had an origin other than the workers 'and peasants'. Therefore, the commanders of the units were often appointed young years, who did not have not only a military education, but also sufficient combat experience.
    Another reason for the defeats of the spacecraft at the beginning of the war is Stalin's "self-isolation" at his dacha, associated with his binge because of the betrayal of "friend Adolf", which lasted 10 days. And only on July 3, 1941, Stalin made an appeal to the people, which is considered the beginning of organized defense.
    The third reason was the remoteness of the ammunition depots in the rear from the front line.
    I settled on the main ones. In fact, there are many more reasons.
    1. Winnie
      Winnie
      -5
      20 June 2020 10: 47
      Why did it happen?
    2. Winnie
      Winnie
      -5
      20 June 2020 10: 49
      Censorship forbids people to know the truth?
      1. Bakht
        Bakht
        +3
        20 June 2020 13: 00
        There is no censorship. There are adequate people who know the story. And ignoramuses put cons.
        1. The comment was deleted.
          1. Bakht
            Bakht
            +4
            20 June 2020 21: 48
            I had in mind only the cons. What you write may be your personal opinion. But not true.
    3. Binder
      Binder
      -6
      20 June 2020 17: 19
      Everything that you write is undoubtedly true, but not these reasons played a major role in the failures of the 1941 spacecraft. The two main factors that allowed the Wehrmacht to reach the suburbs of Moscow were the strategic miscalculations of the leadership of the USSR and the high professionalism of the German military from generals to ordinary soldiers. The soldiers of the Red Army in June 1941, unfortunately, were much inferior in terms of combat skill to their German counterparts. Well, and, of course, the motivation of the KA fighters, because among them there were many those whose families suffered in the processes of dispossession, collectivization, and repression of the 30s. Therefore, there was such a high percentage of missing people - simply deserters and surrendered. Yesterday, the peasant who survived the Holodomor and the death of those close to him at the hands of the KGBists did not want to shed blood for the Bolsheviks. Somehow, although this is only the tip of the iceberg ...
      1. Dear sofa expert.
        Dear sofa expert.
        +1
        20 June 2020 21: 28
        Therefore, there was such a high percentage of missing people - simply deserters and surrendered. Yesterday the peasant who survived the Holodomor and the death of those close to him at the hands of the KGBists did not want to shed blood for the Bolsheviks.

        Yes, something like that). Famine, then.
        Yes, only western Ukraine was in Poland then. There was no "famine". But the traitors, deserters and all kinds of UPA, there were just zapadentsy.
        But eastern Ukraine experienced a famine ("famine"), as well as not only Ukraine, but for some reason they were going to the battle "for their homeland, for Stalin."
        Doesn't that seem strange to you?
        1. Binder
          Binder
          -5
          20 June 2020 21: 50
          It seems to me strange your amazing naivety - believe in primitive fairy tales of illiterate propagandists. "Anyone there UPA" fought both the Soviets and the Germans, and Stepan Bandera, by the way, was in a German concentration camp. You have a mania to talk about the fact that the traitors and accomplices of the Nazis were entirely from Western Ukraine, and meanwhile, only in one ROA, Vlasov had more Russians than there were all the collaborators and traitors from other republics of the USSR. But besides the ROA, there were also Cossack corps, Russian SS divisions, etc. You cannot erase words from a song, and facts are a stubborn thing, so don't blame me ...
          1. Dear sofa expert.
            Dear sofa expert.
            +2
            20 June 2020 22: 32
            ... your amazing naivety .., "..You have a mania ...

            - Do we really discuss me?
            Or is it such a purely Jewish habit of trying to cover up one’s ignorance with a personalization?
            1. The comment was deleted.
              1. The comment was deleted.
              2. plabu
                plabu
                +3
                20 June 2020 23: 18
                What are all the brave in the internet ... bully For a long time already, at one event, something like a showdown, a preliminary stage, so to speak, one began to list what belts he had and so on, to which he received a simple answer, a set of numbers, previously called VUS, now I do not know how it is correctly now called, and after that answer his neighbor began to push hard in the side - well, then I asked what the numbers were - let's call it that, they answered me, and it became clear that the owner of the belts simply would not have reached the place. Even in the distant army past, there was already a saying - "don't run from a sniper, you will die tired" (c)
                PS Morality, it’s easier to not try?
                Here already in the topic of the predecessor, although not for you personally, they asked the question - who calculated this ethnic composition? And according to the number of questions, decently differing figures from a variety of sources have remained, and the number of people by ethnic group leads people who have a very peculiar reputation even in the professional environment ...
                So there are so many more questions than answers ...
                1. Binder
                  Binder
                  0
                  21 June 2020 18: 39
                  Quote: 321
                  what are his belts and stuff, to which he received a simple answer, a set of numbers, previously called the VUS

                  I'm not one of those who list the belts or trump the VUS, although there is something in the asset. Just can not stand rudeness.

                  Quote: 321
                  easier to not try?

                  How much easier? what
                  As for the number of traitors who served the Nazis, the figures are very accurate from the German archives in the public domain - use it.
                  1. plabu
                    plabu
                    0
                    22 June 2020 09: 27
                    Only even these figures differ from those that our historians sometimes lay out, so that there were, by and will be questions about the numbers.
        2. Nikolai Miracles
          Nikolai Miracles
          +1
          21 June 2020 06: 13
          Quote: Dear sofa expert.
          Yes, only western Ukraine was in Poland then. There was no "famine". But the traitors, deserters and all kinds of UPA, there were just zapadentsy.

          Nothing strange. They did not consider the USSR their homeland. By the way, many of them were called up to the passing Red Army in 1944. They reached Berlin, received orders and medals, combat experience, and then to caches in the woods.
          1. Dear sofa expert.
            Dear sofa expert.
            +2
            21 June 2020 11: 26
            Nothing strange. They did not consider the USSR their homeland.

            Of course, nothing strange. I also think so, but why do these populist mantras about the "famines" drag in there? What relation to the famine in the Soviet Union did the Poles who later became “zapadentsy” have? And it was precisely these, in their absolute majority, who were traitors, deserters, and collaborators. The UPA army alone, together with the underground, amounted to more than 400 thousand people. And if you add their families there, which, in turn, are also their natural support, plus the number of "sympathizers" to them, then the figure will increase many times over.
            And what this “wise guy” wrote, a la:

            But besides the ROA, there were also Cossack corps, Russian SS divisions, etc.

            ... so let him first find and stick his inquisitive nose into the sources that family-name describe the ethnic composition of these “Russian armies”. He will be surprised at the number of diverse names there: from Georgian, to German and Polish.
            1. Nikolai Miracles
              Nikolai Miracles
              +1
              21 June 2020 11: 46
              Quote: Dear sofa expert.
              Poles who later became "zapadentsami"

              They were not Poles. And after the war they got married with those who really survived the famine of 1932-33. This is the current center of Ukraine. And zapadentsy try to slope and emigrate to work.
    4. boriz
      boriz
      +3
      20 June 2020 20: 42
      All three reasons are nonsense.
      The decisive role of the "purge" was debunked by V. Rezun, who was not at all a fan of Stalin.
      For a 10-day binge of Stalin in a decent company (if you suddenly get into this), you can get it in the face. Before the war, Stalin was engaged in providing the army with what the army ordered. It's amazing how he handled it. He was not involved in the planning of hostilities. It was a bed of such "specialists" as Zhukov, Timoshenko, Pavlov, Kirponos and others, lower. Stalin expected problems, but he could not imagine such a catastrophe. And these 10 days he just personally figured out what happened. And after the war (when the atomic bomb had already been made and the fever subsided), from 1949 he puzzled Lieutenant General Pokrovsky to figure out what was happening in June - July 1941. The famous "5 questions of General Pokrovsky" were answered by all the commanders who at the beginning of the war held general positions. Stalin said: "The winners are on trial." This was one of the reasons for his murder.
      Well, with warehouses - just ridiculous. Just the unreasonable proximity of the warehouses to the border, allowed the Germans to seize huge reserves, which allowed them not to save fuel, use captured weapons, etc. Far were the remaining, reserve depots. They were not intended for the operational supply of troops.
      1. Bakht
        Bakht
        +4
        20 June 2020 21: 52
        Here, people often boast of their military knowledge. No offense and not personally to you. How far do you think front warehouses should be from the front? 10 km, 100 km, maybe it’s better to keep them near Moscow?
        The Western Special had District warehouses at a distance of up to 50 km from the border. With poor transportation equipment is this a reasonable distance or not? The pace of advancement of German troops at 25 km per day was not expected by anyone. Manstein walked 4 km in 200 days. This was not in any Charter, not a single army of that time.
        So, the question is simple. At what distance from the front line should front warehouses be located?
        1. boriz
          boriz
          +1
          20 June 2020 22: 37
          Depth of division warehouses is 40-60 km.
          District (front) - 500 km and more.
          As for the advancement of the German units, Zhukov (then - the beginning of the General Staff of the Red Army) wrote in the report of the General Staff about the war between Germany and France: "I don't need this." And in France, the Germans also moved not 5 kilometers a day. That is why the district warehouses are closer than 50 km.
          And the Germans had aviation for no secret. And she, including, and the warehouses could smash (like the Badayevsky in Leningrad).
          1. Bakht
            Bakht
            +2
            20 June 2020 22: 43
            The location of the District Warehouses was approximately 50 km from the border. This is if Pavlov did not lie at the interrogation.
            500 km and more is fantastic (my opinion). For example, in July 1943, front-line warehouses were located in Kursk. This is clearly not 500 km. And on July 7-8, Rokossovsky (probably still a specialist in his field) ordered the warehouses to be relocated closer to the troops.
            As of the summer of 1941, warehouses of 500 km - this is unrealistic fantasy. There was no motor transport, and the railway network of western Ukraine and Belarus was very poor.
            What Zhukov wrote was based on. The Germans in France took a big risk. The Red Army, unlike the French army, launched counterattacks. Not always successful, but in Ukraine Popel’s group thwarted the advance of the 11th division of the Germans precisely because of the successful counterattack on the flank.
          2. Bakht
            Bakht
            +1
            20 June 2020 22: 48
            Depth of division warehouses - 40-60 km

            According to the charters of that time, the division occupies a defense zone of 7-8 km (up to 10 km). In the depth of 6-8 km. A warehouse of 60 km is not even an army, but a front line rear.
            1. boriz
              boriz
              0
              20 June 2020 22: 52
              http://www.soldat.ru/doc/mobilization/mob/chapter6_1.html

              The data of a serious source of Soviet times are given.
              1. Bakht
                Bakht
                +1
                20 June 2020 22: 56
                Yes, I read this document. But pay attention to such a moment.
                If the regimental point was located 3-8 km, then the next step is the division. And already immediately 40-60 km?
                In conditions of weak road and horse-drawn transport, how long does it take to deliver ammunition to the front line? When countering enemy aircraft?
                40 km goes far beyond the division rear. In practice (Rokossovsky will not lie), front-line warehouses were located at most 100 km from the front line.
                1. Bakht
                  Bakht
                  +1
                  20 June 2020 23: 04
                  The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of 3-nd and partially of the 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (of the 1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.

                  The deployment of a significant number of art warehouses at a small distance from the state border created favorable conditions for the uninterrupted supply of our troops in the event of a transfer of hostilities to enemy territory.

                  However, in such a deployment of warehouses there was also a great threat of massive losses of weapons and ammunition in the event of an unfavorable development of hostilities in the initial period of the war, when conditions for timely evacuation of stocks might not be available.

                  What do we have in the dry residue? Warehouses were located correctly. As you say, up to 600 km in depth. But these are your words:

                  Just the unreasonable proximity of the warehouses to the border, allowed the Germans to seize huge reserves, which allowed them not to save fuel, use captured weapons, etc. Far were the remaining, reserve depots. They were not intended for the operational supply of troops.

                  So the Germans could not take a large number of trophies near the border. Or isn’t it? Were the warehouses located correctly or not?
                2. boriz
                  boriz
                  +1
                  20 June 2020 23: 04
                  It’s delivered from the regimental points to the front line. No problem. And higher warehouses must maintain a non-decreasing regulatory balance. For this, special urgency is not needed.
                  Rokossovsky commanded the front in a completely different setting.
                  1. Bakht
                    Bakht
                    +2
                    20 June 2020 23: 09
                    Judging by your words and documents, advanced warehouses were insignificant. By the way, Pavlov testified during the interrogation that the fuel and lubricants district warehouses were located in Mozdok. That beats me. District warehouses of the Western Special were located on the territory of the North Caucasus. Is it possible?
                    There are few materials on the location of warehouses. But the topic is interesting. Warehouses are needed to supply troops, the lack of transport makes it necessary to bring them closer to the front line, and security requires them to be removed. How to find a middle ground?
                    1. boriz
                      boriz
                      +3
                      20 June 2020 23: 17
                      Fuel and lubricants in Mozdok is treason. Ammunition and other materials near the border are also treason.
                      I did not say that the forward warehouses were insignificant. Just because of the loss of advanced warehouses, a lot of weapons and materials were lost. And the theme "one rifle for three" arose. But this is the fault of Timoshenko and Zhukov. Stalin did everything he needed.
                      1. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +1
                        20 June 2020 23: 20
                        The fact that the capacity of the warehouses near the border was insignificant, you did not say. It's right. This can be seen from my document. These were warehouses of the 4th category.
                        I forgot to give a link. Here is the location of the warehouses before the war.

                        http://www.soldat.ru/doc/mobilization/mob/chapter6_2.html
                      2. boriz
                        boriz
                        +2
                        20 June 2020 23: 26
                        Well, that’s what it says here that the district warehouses were overloaded, right down to laying out the shots on the ground. And all this happiness drove 50 km to the border ... This is not a betrayal?
                      3. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +1
                        20 June 2020 23: 28
                        50 km to the border, I do not consider a crime. This is far enough. It was believed that the covering forces (those same 57 divisions) could hold out for several days.
                      4. boriz
                        boriz
                        0
                        20 June 2020 23: 30
                        Warehouse for a week can not be taken out. And in a week, troops can move up to 50 km anywhere. If it cost 50 km ...
                      5. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        0
                        20 June 2020 23: 32
                        I think we all discussed. I said that the topic is not disclosed in modern research. We can only guess. It was bad or good.
                        But already now we found out that quite a lot of warehouses were far beyond the boundaries of the District.
                  2. Bakht
                    Bakht
                    0
                    20 June 2020 23: 16
                    Here, I’ve got an interesting document of our time. I had to make a screen

                    1. boriz
                      boriz
                      +1
                      20 June 2020 23: 20
                      Well, right, when the front is about to advance.
                      And when the district sits, not knowing where and when they will strike and how deep the coverage will be ...
                      1. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +1
                        20 June 2020 23: 24
                        It is truth too. But in vain do you think that Rokossovsky acted in other conditions. On July 7-8, the Germans' breakthrough to Kursk was real. Rokossovsky was afraid of the encirclement of the front troops and ordered (by the way, he had no right to do this) to relocate the depots closer so that at a critical moment the troops would not be left without ammunition.
                        The main point, I consider the uninterrupted supply of troops. And it was determined by vehicles of that time. And the mileage is small and the load capacity is small.
                        I did not do an analysis of the location of the Red Army warehouses. But it seems to me that it was not so criminal.
                      2. boriz
                        boriz
                        +1
                        20 June 2020 23: 54
                        When I wrote about 500 km, I meant that it MUST be.
                        But I looked at the tablet.

                        http://www.soldat.ru/doc/mobilization/mob/chapter6_2.html

                        There are many district and close to 500 km there. 3 warehouses in Moldova, where are there 500? 3 warehouses in Lithuania, Lviv region, Kamyanets-Podilsky, Brest region, Bialystok region (this is generally Poland now). What about lower-level warehouses? In short, they dragged everything to the border.
                      3. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        0
                        20 June 2020 23: 57
                        What you listed is just warehouses of the 3rd and 4th categories. 1st is only Gomel.
                      4. boriz
                        boriz
                        0
                        20 June 2020 23: 58
                        But these are district warehouses. The rest are even closer. And there, too, something was stored.
                      5. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +1
                        21 June 2020 00: 01
                        Maybe this will tell:

                        In the military districts, by the beginning of the war, there were 111 stationary artillery bases and warehouses, including 3 bases and 5 armament and ammunition depots and 92 ammunition depots, which stored mob reserves and stocks of the current allowances of the districts. In total, 50% of all resources of the Red Army accumulated by the beginning of 1941 (43,6 million shells and mines) were stored in district ammunition depots.

                        But there is no indication that it is in the district warehouses of the Western Regions.

                        Of the total number of district warehouses, 10 were built in the pre-Soviet period, 20 were organized in 1941 in the Baltic republics, Western Belarus and Ukraine on the basis of military warehouses already existing there, 13 were equipped in the open air, and the remaining 68 warehouses were created during the Soviet era in mainly in 1930-1940

                        About 54% of the district subordinate warehouses were located in five border districts (LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO). They were deployed in the areas in which hostilities subsequently unfolded. Some internal districts (MBO, ORVO, UrVO, PrivO) did not have their own ammunition depots and stored their expenditures in central warehouses, where they were allocated the corresponding storage space.

                        In each border region there were one or two large warehouses, usually of the 1st category, which were used as operational supply bases for troops. They were characterized by significant operational activities for receiving ammunition from the center and sending them to the troops. Some warehouses had equipment and assembly workshops and workshops for updating sleeves. The rest of the warehouses were small (3 and 4 categories) and were used mainly for the storage of mobil stocks.
        2. Oleg Rambover
          Oleg Rambover
          0
          20 June 2020 23: 28
          Quote: Bakht
          The pace of advancement of German troops at 25 km per day was not expected by anyone. Manstein walked 4 km in 200 days. This was not in any Charter, not a single army of that time.

          But after the French company, where, in the apt expression of the respected Neukropny, the French did not fight, the speed of advance was 15 km per day, one would have guessed.
          1. Bakht
            Bakht
            +1
            20 June 2020 23: 30
            15 km with almost no resistance. It could be assumed that in the USSR the pace of progress will be lower.
            The surprise for the Soviet leadership (Zhukov wrote about this) was completely different. By the way, it was this factor (which helped the Germans win the first battles) that caused their defeat. This was written by Manstein. And Guderian.
            1. Oleg Rambover
              Oleg Rambover
              0
              21 June 2020 00: 21
              Quote: Bakht
              15 km with almost no resistance. It could be assumed that in the USSR the pace of progress will be lower.

              This turned out to be a clearly erroneous assumption.

              Quote: Bakht
              The surprise for the Soviet leadership (Zhukov wrote about this) was completely different.

              Quote: Bakht
              The pace of advancement of German troops at 25 km per day was not expected by anyone.

              So what was a surprise?
              1. Bakht
                Bakht
                +1
                21 June 2020 00: 27
                Are we talking about assumptions? The pace of advancement was unexpected for the Germans.
                By the way, these rates were blocked later. Soviet troops in the operation of Bagration and the liberation of Poland.
                -----
                What was a surprise? The construction of German troops in one echelon. They suffered this all war. Hitler did not understand the value of operational reserves. As he himself said:

                This little little thing that you call operational art can be mastered by everyone.
                1. Oleg Rambover
                  Oleg Rambover
                  0
                  21 June 2020 12: 51
                  Well, OK. In any case, the location of the warehouses 50 km from the border was a mistake.
                  1. Bakht
                    Bakht
                    +1
                    21 June 2020 12: 59
                    This is not obvious. According to the statutory documents, it seems to be a mistake. According to the data that we have in the table, warehouses of small capacity were located near the border. In terms of carrying capacity and the number of vehicles, this was the right decision. Balance is hard to find.
                    There is a very good study by Yegorov "June 1941. Defeat of the Western Front". A very voluminous study. Detailed. Lots of numbers and comparisons. There was no motor transport. Suppose the warehouses would be located 500 km away. The troops would be left without ammunition at all.
                    1. Bakht
                      Bakht
                      +2
                      21 June 2020 13: 03
                      33rd Panzer Division of the 11th mechanized corps (as of June 18): gas tankers - 7%, water and oil tankers - 9%, no gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel; The 33rd Anti-Aircraft Division has four 37-mm guns of the 1st battery, the remaining two batteries are not equipped, and there are no traction and ammunition. This is already much more serious. 85th Infantry Division of the 3rd Army (as of June 21): GAZ-AA supernumerary vehicles - 177, lack of ZIS-5 vehicles - 230, general deficiency subject to replacement - 129 vehicles. 71st tank regiment of the 36th tank division of the 17th mechanized corps (as of June 21): gas tankers - 33%, tankers - 50%, oil and gas tankers - 40%, gasoline per regiment 1,4 tons with a norm of 28,5 tons diesel fuel - 0,9 tons at a rate of 110 tons, no lubricating oils. Tanks and BA in the division of less than three dozen, so the lack of auxiliary equipment can be considered bearable.

                      The former chief of staff of the 29th TD of the 11th MK N. M. Kalanchuk recalled that the motorized rifle regiment of the division had only five vehicles; the artillery regiment fully equipped with guns did not have a single tractor - when the war broke out, howitzers were pulled by tanks; steel half-pontoons entered the pontoon-bridge battalion, but there were no special vehicles for their transportation; three thousand people had no personal small arms.

                      According to mobilization plans, it was necessary to take about 100000 cars and tractors from the national economy. With a total fleet of the whole country of 400 cars. I bring figures from memory. Perhaps they need to be clarified. When did you have to do this?
                      1. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +1
                        21 June 2020 13: 06
                        You can say that Stalin "overslept". It was necessary to complete everything in advance. There was no material and technical base. There were no divisional warehouses. Physically it was not. The fuel was in Mozdok (I repeat, according to Pavlov).
                        So where should the divisions' ammunition points be located?
                    2. Oleg Rambover
                      Oleg Rambover
                      0
                      21 June 2020 15: 36
                      I understand the reasons for placing warehouses 50 km from the troops, I am sure that not stupid people made this decision. It is not obvious why troops should be deployed directly at the border.
                      1. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +1
                        21 June 2020 15: 52
                        We take one fact and try to add a picture.
                        One must understand the logic and charters of that time. Without relying on aftertaste. The country's defense plan had its own logic. The logic of that time. All countries deployed troops near the border. Even the States, instead of withdrawing the fleet to San Diego, kept him at the forefront in Hawaii. The Polish army was near the border. The French went to Belgium to meet the Germans on the border of Germany and Belgium. This is a common practice of the time.

                        The Soviet plan of defense of the country had the same logic, but taking into account the battles of the first two years of the war. I do not pretend to be fully knowledgeable, but to me the deployment of Soviet troops seems reasonable.

                        The USSR kept only 57 divisions on the border. These are cover troops. Their task is to detain the Germans and identify the directions of the main attacks. Rezun did not even realize that criticizing Stalin, he confirms this version. It was believed that the covering forces (this is the First Strategic Echelon) would detain the Germans for a week or two. The second Strategic echelon was deployed along the Dnieper. It is 150-200 km east of the border. The Third Strategic Echelon was considered as a reserve and included only 3 or 4 armies.
                        The location of the mechanized corps in the protrusions also made sense. The General Staff could not know the direction of the main strikes of the Germans. Placing the MechCorps in the ledges facilitated their counterattacks on the flank of the wedged enemy. But the troops need fuel and ammunition. Hence the location of part of the warehouses near the troops.

                        After all, Zhukov clearly said. It was a surprise for us that the Germans would strike with all their might, practically leaving no reserves. The first reports from the front say that the total number of German divisions is 50 or 60. Documents were posted on the website of the Ministry of Defense just a couple of days ago. The Germans throughout the war had problems with reserves. Because Hitler did not understand the value of reserves. Read Bock's diary, the memoirs of Guderian and Manstein. If, when attacking France, the OKW had 45 divisions in reserve, then on June 22, the OKW had only 22 divisions. The front is almost three times extended.
                        50-60 divisions The Soviet leadership hoped to hold back a more or less long time. But the Germans struck at once with all their might. 57 divisions will not be able to contain the blow of 170 divisions. Even in auxiliary directions, the Germans had an advantage in strength. Plus tactical mistakes. Pavlov overlooked the blow from Brest, according to the results of the games they expected that the Germans would strike at Baranavichy, and they hit right away at Minsk. Well, the confusion and confusion on the ground. That is, the depth of operations by the Germans was increased.

                        Everything is interconnected here. Incorrect assessment of the first strike, the uncertainty of the enemy’s plans, the initiative of the enemy, the lack of vehicles in the Red Army, low-powered trucks and tractors. Hence the decisions in which we now see stupidity or betrayal.

                        I say again that I am not clairvoyant and do not pretend to be omniscient. But the picture seems logical to me. And do not forget another statement by Zhukov:

                        We often forget that we fought with the best army in the world.
                      2. Oleg Rambover
                        Oleg Rambover
                        -1
                        22 June 2020 00: 16
                        Quote: Bakht
                        The country's defense plan had its own logic. The logic of that time. All countries deployed troops near the border.

                        Yes, I agree. Both Poland at 39 and France at 40 acted in this logic, the logic of the First World War. And the German Wehrmacht demonstrated that this logic is no longer valid, sequentially in the years 39, 40 and 41. No one wanted to learn from the mistakes of others.

                        Quote: Bakht
                        I do not pretend to be fully knowledgeable, but to me the deployment of Soviet troops seems reasonable.

                        But judging by the disaster of 41 years, justified does not mean right.

                        Quote: Bakht
                        The location of the mechanized corps in the protrusions also made sense. The General Staff could not know the direction of the main strikes of the Germans. Placing the MechCorps in the ledges facilitated their counterattacks on the flank of the wedged enemy. But the troops need fuel and ammunition. Hence the location of part of the warehouses near the troops.

                        But we know how the story turned out, and we know that these mechanized corps disappeared into the air without causing serious damage to the enemy. What was the point if they were meaninglessly lost just because they were in these ledges.

                        Quote: Bakht
                        The USSR kept only 57 divisions on the border. These are cover troops. Their task is to detain the Germans and identify the directions of the main attacks. Rezun did not even realize that criticizing Stalin, he confirms this version. It was believed that the covering forces (this is the First Strategic Echelon) would detain the Germans for a week or two. The second Strategic echelon was deployed along the Dnieper. It is 150-200 km east of the border.

                        To the Dnieper 500 km. And how, detained? They lost people and ammunition, and the speed of advance of the enemy was almost as if there was no resistance at all.

                        Quote: Bakht
                        Everything is interconnected here. Incorrect assessment of the first strike, the uncertainty of the enemy’s plans, the initiative of the enemy, the lack of vehicles in the Red Army, low-powered trucks and tractors.

                        And who is responsible for this?
                      3. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +3
                        22 June 2020 00: 44
                        1. The Wehrmacht fought in the same way as the others. "Not an inch of your land."
                        2. No one knows how it would be right. Justified means reasonably reasonable.
                        3. The fact that they have not been detained just speaks of the flawedness of "Rezun's theories". But the Red Army fought according to these templates until 1943. Although in the summer of 1942 officers of the General Staff pointed out the flawedness of such tactics.
                        4. The mechanized corps did not dissolve. They became the framework that allowed to delay the German offensive. It should be borne in mind that the mechanized corps themselves were not balanced. The Wehrmacht found the proper organization of the tank divisions after two years of war. And improved until 1943. Soviet tank armies were much better organized than the 1941 mechanized corps. Although they were smaller in number.
                        5. No one bears responsibility. Industry has given what it could give. Is it true that the USSR was not a leading industrial power, is Stalin responsible? This is something new. And military planning proceeded from those realities that were at hand. Stalin did not have a pair of terminator divisions.
                      4. Oleg Rambover
                        Oleg Rambover
                        -1
                        23 June 2020 15: 39
                        Quote: Bakht
                        1. The Wehrmacht fought in the same way as the others. "Not an inch of your land."

                        Judging by the red banner over the Reichstag, not the most correct tactics.

                        Quote: Bakht
                        2. No one knows how it would be right. Justified means reasonably reasonable.

                        Minsk fell a week later, a month later they were near Kiev, Leningrad, Smolensk. The number of prisoners went to millions. Lost equipment, weapons, ammunition would be enough for a couple of years of war. It does not seem reasonable to me.

                        Quote: Bakht
                        3. The fact that they have not been detained just speaks of the flawedness of "Rezun's theories". But the Red Army fought according to these templates until 1943. Although in the summer of 1942 officers of the General Staff pointed out the flawedness of such tactics.

                        I don't remember what the "Rezun's theories" are. That Stalin wanted to attack first? At 41, hardly.

                        Quote: Bakht
                        4. The mechanized corps did not dissolve. They became the framework that allowed to delay the German offensive. It should be borne in mind that the mechanized corps themselves were not balanced. The Wehrmacht found the proper organization of the tank divisions after two years of war. And improved until 1943. Soviet tank armies were much better organized than the 1941 mechanized corps. Although they were smaller in number.

                        They disappeared into the cauldrons, losing all their equipment in a week, mostly abandoned. If they influenced the promotion of the Wehrmacht, then not much.

                        Quote: Bakht
                        No one bears responsibility.

                        This is understandable, victory has many parents, and defeats are an orphan. But, my, it would be possible to at least declare combat readiness and distribute and camouflage planes at field airfields.

                        Quote: Bakht
                        Is it true that the USSR was not a leading industrial power, is Stalin responsible? This is something new.

                        Eeee ... What?

                        I do not understand, you want to say that the Soviet leadership was planning the beginning of the war. In my opinion, it is obvious that it overslept the beginning of the war. Therefore, the topic is not interesting.
                        That is the theme that Stalin was not a communist, much more vital. Sorry, you did not want to develop this topic.
                      5. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +1
                        23 June 2020 16: 22
                        I don’t want to develop this. If you think you overslept, then I spent a lot of time proving that this is not so.
                        Common words do not interest me.
      2. Winnie
        Winnie
        -4
        20 June 2020 22: 02
        Do you deny the repression in the Red Army 1937-1938gg?
        Another decent company will express regret that Zhukov did not shoot Stalin as a deserter under wartime laws. When Zhukov 26.06.41 arrived at Stalin's cottage, he went out with his hands up ...
        When they give you only three cartridges for one rifle and say: get weapons in battle - then will it be funny to you too?
        1. Bakht
          Bakht
          +2
          20 June 2020 22: 45
          I ask you - do not write nonsense. I’m not even going to answer. And about the cottage, and about the raised hands, and about the rifle with 3 rounds.
          1. Winnie
            Winnie
            -2
            4 July 2020 13: 46
            I regret that you do not know and do not want to know the history of Russia. hi
            1. Bakht
              Bakht
              +3
              4 July 2020 13: 48
              Woke up? Look who's Talking....
        2. boriz
          boriz
          0
          20 June 2020 22: 49
          It’s not interesting to argue with you; you don’t know anything.
          Suvorov wrote very well about repression in The Purification. In general, his books are very controversial, tendentious, but no one argues with "Purification". The documents cited there have been closed for more than 20 years. Read it.
          Zhukov, at the time you described, he was sitting with his tongue stuck in his ass. They simply would not have allowed him close to Stalin. According to the memoirs of AN Mikoyan, when Stalin in the first days could not get military answers to what was happening, he simply went with the members of the Politburo to the General Staff and began to demand answers on the spot, "Zhukov burst into tears and ran out of the office." Was it he who was going to arrest Stalin?
          Please provide your data on how many rifles and ammunition were in the Red Army on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
          Both rifles and cartridges were heaped. The USSR was the only one in the world to produce 1,5 million automatic rifles, which were later emulated by the Germans in the second half of the war and the Belgians in their FN FAL. We used technical solutions of CBT.
          1. Winnie
            Winnie
            -2
            4 July 2020 14: 40
            went with members of the Politburo to the General Staff

            To start. Not at the General Staff, but at the People’s Commissariat of Defense on June 29. There are many versions. I will bring one of them.

            The version of prostration, along with the well-known fact that Stalin did not speak publicly in the first 10 days of the war, led to the widespread notion that Stalin was in prostration for the entire period from the beginning of the war until July 3. In the biography of Stalin, which appeared in the USA and England in 1990 and became the basis of the television series, it is reported (already without reference to Khrushchev and Beria):
            Stalin was in prostration. During the week, he rarely left his villa in Kuntsevo. His name disappeared from the newspapers. For 10 days, the Soviet Union did not have a leader. Only on July 1 did Stalin recover.

            Jonathan Lewis, Philip Whitehead. "Stalin." New York, 1990. 805
            1. boriz
              boriz
              +1
              4 July 2020 17: 15
              1990 - the height of anti-Stalinist hysteria. Yes, even the British. The ultimate truth, damn it, British scientists ...
              I don’t even want to discuss it.
    5. Lysik001
      Lysik001
      +1
      22 June 2020 09: 49
      I read Churchill's memoirs, where he directly speaks of Tukhachevsky’s conspiracy against Stalin. His intelligence has repeatedly reported to him. What is the point of lying to him after so many years? And you never named the main reason! We just were not ready for a modern war! Just like other countries that Hitler defeated before us. Clear interaction of all military branches is our main problem. But of course, not the only one. A factor of military inexperience also took place.
  2. Valentine
    Valentine
    +5
    20 June 2020 12: 04
    If, by and large, the beginning of the war did not promise us anything but defeat, and in percentage terms it was even difficult to predict, and in the first months of the war we suffered an impressive defeat on all fronts, but ... I look at the military video footage, and in my minds it does not fit how the leadership of our country was able to do so that in the shortest possible time, during the bombing, shelling, during the most severe defeats at the fronts, hundreds of defense enterprises were stopped, dismantled, shipped and delivered to the places of the Urals and Siberia, which immediately, from the wheels, began to produce military products so necessary for our front, and no matter what anyone said, here the "pointing and guiding" hand of the VKPB was involved, its solidity and cohesion of that time, although the 37th year showed there was some ferment in it, but the people, as always in a hard time for the Fatherland, gathered in a single fist around its leader and his party to repulse the enemy. And now let's imagine the present time, time H, when samurai from the east, Chinese and Turks from the south, Ukrainians and the whole Eurosvor from the west, and what force will unite our people, isn't it EdRo ???? ... And thanks to those 27 million lives of our people lost during the Second World War, we still live in our country, and speak our own, though not all, language, but it could be completely different.
  3. Sergey Latyshev
    Sergey Latyshev
    -2
    20 June 2020 15: 10
    And he overslept, did not oversleep, and part of the troops, including the border troops, were covered in the barracks.

    According to the diaries of the German General Staffists and the memoirs of our military: they very clearly felt when the Red Army from the order to expel the provocateurs abroad, went to the order to seriously defend themselves in the war.
    1. Bakht
      Bakht
      +3
      20 June 2020 16: 42
      from the order to expel the provocateurs abroad, passed to the order to seriously defend in the war

      I did not understand this phrase. Do not clarify?
      1. Sergey Latyshev
        Sergey Latyshev
        -1
        22 June 2020 08: 54
        This is in the memoirs and diaries of both parties.
        At the beginning there was an installation - to defeat with little blood, quickly tossed out the border of the USSR. As stated before the war.
        Then the approach came: to defend, to exhaust, to carry out mainly counterattacks.
        1. Bakht
          Bakht
          +3
          22 June 2020 08: 58
          What provocateurs to expel abroad?
          When did the German General Staff say "seriously defend"?
          You have not answered. I still didn't understand anything.

          June 23, 1941. 2nd day of war
          The general situation is best described in the report of the headquarters of the 4th Army: the enemy in the Bialystok sack is fighting not for his life, but for gaining time.
          -----
          June 29, 1941 (Sunday). 8th day of war
          Infantry Inspector General Ott reported on his impressions of the battle in the Grodno area. The stubborn resistance of the Russians makes us fight in accordance with all the rules of our combat manuals. In Poland and in the West we could allow ourselves some well-known liberties and deviations from statutory principles; this is now unacceptable.
          1. Sergey Latyshev
            Sergey Latyshev
            -1
            22 June 2020 09: 02
            Then read. Both memoirs and analytics.
            At the beginning headquarters. German (not verbatim, from memory) in the entries:

            We clearly saw the moment when the Red Army switched from trying to drive the Wehrmacht troops abroad to planned defense.
            1. Bakht
              Bakht
              +3
              22 June 2020 09: 03
              I read. But you do not give links. I have not seen this anywhere. Take the trouble to at least indicate a section of the front.
              1. Sergey Latyshev
                Sergey Latyshev
                -1
                22 June 2020 09: 12
                And I won’t give.
                It is purely voluntary - to do work for someone, look for links.
                At my work, my comrades are paid money for this ...

                Plot: Wrote Nach. headquarters, or deputy. beg. Wehrmacht headquarters. Diary or memoirs. A fairly well-known surname, I don’t remember now, but it is often quoted.
                1. Bakht
                  Bakht
                  +2
                  22 June 2020 09: 14
                  So - empty words. I do not have such information.
                  1. Sergey Latyshev
                    Sergey Latyshev
                    -1
                    22 June 2020 09: 15
                    Yes, as you wish.
                    Everyone hears what he wants.
                    1. Bakht
                      Bakht
                      +3
                      22 June 2020 09: 16
                      Sure. I listen to serious arguments. Not rumors. The diary of the chief of staff of the ground forces I have cited. Your words are not supported by anything. They are not even supported by the actual course of hostilities.
                      1. Sergey Latyshev
                        Sergey Latyshev
                        -1
                        22 June 2020 09: 44
                        We are talking about different things.
                        But since this is so important to you, I’ll give you the plus points.
                      2. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +1
                        22 June 2020 09: 45
                        Pluses are not important to me. I need information. And I didn’t get it.
  4. Cyril
    Cyril
    -7
    20 June 2020 16: 58
    Despite all the hysteria and schizophrenic nature of the article, the author is right in one thing - the German attack was not a surprise to the USSR.

    Not so long ago, dear Bakhtiyar convinced me of the opposite, when we argued about comparing the situation in France and the situation in the USSR.
    1. Bakht
      Bakht
      +5
      20 June 2020 20: 21
      Dear Cyril. You do not understand dear Bakhtiyar.
      How could I convince you of the "surprise" of the attack if I got a corn on my tongue, claiming that the order to bring troops to combat readiness and move to the defense lines began on June 17, 1941?
      Show me where I said the attack was "unexpected".
      I beg you, do not attribute to me what I did not say.

      PS I usually do not evaluate the statements. With rare exceptions. But in this case, one minus from me, for the distortion of my words.
      1. Bakht
        Bakht
        +3
        20 June 2020 20: 48
        June 18th. On this day, a directive came from the General Staff, after which units began to be withdrawn to areas of concentration.

        “From the order for the 12th mechanized building No. 0033. June 18, 1941.
        .... At 23:00 p.m. 18.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX, units to step out of occupied winter apartments and concentrate ... (then it is signed which division is playing where) ....

        5. Marches to perform only at night. In areas of concentration, carefully camouflage and organize circular security and surveillance. Dig holes, disperse troops to the company with the company moving 300-400 meters from the company. ”
        ------
        “Colonel General of the Tank Forces P.P. Poluboyarov (former chief of the armored forces of PribOVO):

        “On June 16, at 23 p.m., the command of the 12th mechanized corps received a directive on putting the unit on alert ... On June 18, the corps commander raised the formations and units on alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. On June 19 and 20, this was done.

        On June 16, by order of the district headquarters, the 3rd mechanized corps was also put on alert, which concentrated at the same time in the indicated area. ”
        -----
        Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov (former commander of the 8th army):

        “By the end of the day [June 18], oral orders were given to concentrate troops on the border. On the morning of June 19, I personally checked the progress of the order. ”
        ------
        Major General I.I. Fadeev (former commander of the 10th Infantry Division of the 8th Army):

        “On June 19, 1941, an order was received from the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps, Major General I.F. Nikolaev on bringing the division on alert. All units were immediately withdrawn to the defense area, occupied by bunkers and artillery firing positions. "At dawn, the commanders of regiments, battalions and companies on the ground clarified the combat missions in accordance with the previously developed plan and brought them to the platoon and squad commanders."
        ------
        Major General P.I. Abramidze (former commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 26th Army):

        “On June 20, 1941, I received the following message from the General Staff:“ All the subunits and units of your compound located on the border itself should be withdrawn several kilometers back, that is, to the line of prepared positions. such will not violate the state border. All units of the division must be brought to combat readiness. The execution should be brought to 24 o'clock on June 21, 1941 ""

        I wrote that the Red Army had a maximum of 7-8 days to put it on alert. And not 9 months like France. And on this I continue to insist. 7 days for occupying defense lines for most formations is an unrealistic period. Directly on the border there were 57 divisions. The average density of 25-30 km per division, with statutory constructions of 7-8 km. In the Baltic, the density was 50 km per division.
        1. Cyril
          Cyril
          0
          21 June 2020 05: 03
          Your "the USSR had 7-8 days to prepare" and mean that "the USSR was not ready for war." However, from this article by A. Neukropny, for all its ... um ... emotionality, we see that the USSR still regarded Germany as not just a potential enemy, but as an enemy whose attack is inevitable.

          A. Neukropny says in plain text that the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was precisely an attempt by the USSR to postpone the attack. That is, even at the time of its conclusion, the Soviet Union understood that Germany would attack in the near future.

          And if so, then the USSR had already nearly 2 years to prepare for the attack, which he considered inevitable. Well, then that’s our argument.
          1. Bakht
            Bakht
            0
            21 June 2020 09: 31
            Strange conclusion. The USSR was preparing for war not 2 years, but 10 years.

            From the speech of Stalin 4 February 1931 city

            We are 50-100 years behind advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us.

            7-8 days for the deployment of troops is an absolutely unrealistic thing.

            France has been at war since September 3, 1939. I had time to mobilize and transport troops. The USSR did not have such a handicap. For example. 50 sd She joined the battle on June 22, 1941, 20-30 km from the border. By order of June 16, she began a march to the concentration area, having the task ... on the 15th day of mobilization to take defensive positions. On the 15th day !!!! Soviet troops had 3,5 million personnel in the Western Districts. Scattered at the border of 2000 km and in depth up to 600 km. How long does rifle divisions need to enter concentration areas? 2 days, 3 days? Maybe 2 weeks? Or to keep the mobilized army at the border for two years? To remove 100 thousand trucks and tractors from the national economy according to the mobplan? What country will you feed?
            The Germans went on the offensive with ready-made compact groups. Percussion. For example, in the Kaunas direction, 6 German divisions fell on 9 Soviet battalions. Of these, 4 are tank. How long will the infantry battalion last against the tank division?
            The concentration of German troops according to the plan of Barbarossa began in April. Major shipments began in early June. Beginning in early June, the Soviet leadership began to show concern. After the TASS report on June 14, it was decided to begin military transportation. Weak transport network did not allow to complete it. The USSR did not have the PHYSICAL ability to complete the deployment of troops. And Stalin already knew this by the evening of June 22. He was certainly not a fool.

            In what way the USSR was preparing for war, one can find a lot of literature. How was the Red Army completed until 1939 and after? The experience of fighting on Khalkhin Gol. Everything is on the Internet. How was the industrial base prepared?

            This is best reflected in the works of Isaev. Highly recommend if you have not read.
            1. Cyril
              Cyril
              0
              21 June 2020 10: 28
              We are 50-100 years behind advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us.

              Not. You confuse the general readiness of the state to repel any hypothetical threat in principle and the readiness to repulse a very specific threat from a particular state. In 1939, there was already a realization that Germany would attack the USSR in the coming years. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was an attempt to only delay this attack.

              7-8 days for the deployment of troops is absolutely unrealistic thing.

              So the fact of the matter is that in reality it was not 7-8 days. Once again, the Soviet leadership long before the age of 41 realized that Germany would attack. No one knew only the exact date. But they would realize that they would attack. What prevented all those actions that they began in a hurry to carry out in the early days of the war to be completed earlier, although the evidence of the attack was clear?
              1. Bakht
                Bakht
                +1
                21 June 2020 10: 38
                These actions were hindered by the political situation.
                1. The Moscow Treaty (which you call the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), and it was called the Moscow Treaty, set the task not to delay the German attack, but to avoid being drawn into the war. This is your first thesis, which must be overestimated.
                2. Raise troops on alert and pull them to the border even in April 1941 (in the absence of data) - this means provoking a war. This must be accurately represented.
                3. Preparatory actions (raising troops on alarm, relocation, the beginning of work on the mobplane) could only begin in mid-June.
                4. The latent forms of mobilization of the USSR began in May 1941. This is a bus and 500 people poured into the army. We began the advance of troops from the internal districts. But they advanced to the frontier of the Second Strategic Defense. To the Dnieper.
                5. Once and for all, so that it becomes clear. Small movements (division, corps is already doubtful) can be carried out by the General Staff. Mobilization is an act of the outbreak of war, and only the country's political leadership makes the decision about it. Until mid-June there was no reason for this. The grounds appeared after June 14, 1941.
                1. Cyril
                  Cyril
                  -1
                  21 June 2020 21: 11
                  The Moscow Treaty (which you call the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), and it was called the Moscow Treaty, set the task not to delay the German attack, but to avoid being drawn into the war. This is your first thesis, which must be overestimated.

                  No, it was aimed precisely at deferment, and not at avoidance. Quote from an article on the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense:

                  Moscow did not rule out that after some time complications might arise in Soviet-German relations. Therefore, Stalin and his associates sought to do everything so as not to create any prerequisites for provocations on the part of Germany and delay a possible Soviet-German military conflict for a longer period.

                  Raise troops on alert and pull them to the border even in April 1941 (in the absence of data) - this means provoking a war. This must be accurately represented.

                  Do nothing in conditions when the enemy pulls his troops to the border - this is the same provocation of war. Only in the first case can a quick and powerful answer be given, and in the second it cannot.

                  Once and for all, so that it becomes clear. Small movements (division, corps is already doubtful) can be carried out by the General Staff. Mobilization is an act of the outbreak of war, and only the country's political leadership makes the decision about it. Until mid-June there was no reason for this.

                  Mobilization is not an act of starting a war. The act of starting a war is its official declaration or armed attack.

                  Until mid-June there was no reason for this. The grounds appeared after June 14, 1941.

                  Others in December 1940 years (six months before the start of the war) the Soviet intelligence officer Rudolf von Shelia announced the development of "Directive 21" (an attack plan on the USSR, better known as "Barbarossa").

                  Information on planning an upcoming attack - not enough reason to start preparations for war? Not?
                  1. Bakht
                    Bakht
                    +3
                    21 June 2020 22: 08
                    Cyril, you gave the impression of a thoughtful interlocutor. Themselves highlighted the words possible Soviet-German military conflict.
                    It was an agreement guaranteeing the non-participation of the USSR in the war.
                    Mobilization is war. It was known in 1914, it was known in 1941 and is known now.
                    I do not comment on the tales that the Barbarossa plan lay on Stalin’s desk before Hitler signed it. Precisely because it is a fairy tale.
                    The USSR, having received information about the pulling of troops to the border, held the Great Training Camps and poured 500 reservists into the army, and began redeploying troops closer to the border from internal districts. What else did you have to do?

                    Planning information is not a reason. For example, I’m sure that the General Staff of the Russian Federation, the Pentagon, and hell knows where, there are a lot of documents on the planning of military operations against any country. Planning and decision making are not the same thing.
                    -----
                    There is no abstract knowledge. Now NATO troops are pulling toward the borders of the Russian Federation, NATO strategists are feeling the defense and air defense systems. Conflicts at the borders, economic sanctions and direct threats. Is it time to launch a preemptive strike?
                    1. Cyril
                      Cyril
                      -1
                      22 June 2020 00: 43
                      It was an agreement guaranteeing the non-participation of the USSR in the war.

                      laughing On June 22, 1941, he eloquently told how he "guaranteed" the non-participation of the USSR in the war.

                      Mobilization is war. It was known in 1914, it was known in 1941 and is known now.

                      Where is that written? Where is it written that increased preparation for a probable war is necessarily its beginning?

                      For example, during the events in the Crimea, Russian troops were put on high alert. Putin then even said that not only conventional, but also nuclear forces were put on alert. Was this the start of a war? No.

                      Tales about the fact that Barbaross’s plan was lying on Stalin’s desk before Hitler signed it I don’t comment on. Precisely because it is a fairy tale.

                      Do you deny that von Shelia informed the leadership of the USSR that Germany was preparing a specific plan for a specific attack? I have never said that he had laid out to Stalin the already prepared Barbarossa plan. I said that he announced the development of this plan.

                      The USSR, having received information about the pulling of troops to the border, conducted the Great Training Camps and poured 500 reservists into the army, and began redeploying troops closer to the border from internal districts. What else did you have to do?

                      He should have done this much earlier, when at the end of 1940, information began to arrive (not only from Shelia) about the impending likely attack. And not in the last days before the attack.

                      Sorry, of course, but Hitler has officially stated many times that Germany needs land in the East. This was explicitly spelled out in his Mine Kampf. This was directly expressed in many of his speeches. Until 1939, Germany did not particularly hide that sooner or later there would be a conflict between it and the USSR.

                      And when a residency from a country whose rhetoric clearly expresses expansion to the East sends information about the development of a concrete plan for this attack six months before the attack, this should at least cause some movement.

                      Planning information is not a reason. For example, I’m sure that in the General Staff of the Russian Federation, in the Pentagon, and even the devil knows where, there are a lot of documents on planning military operations against any country. Planning and decision making are not the same thing.

                      Planning information is not an occasion for a preemptive strike, but for planning and preparing a retaliatory strike. And in response to such plans, NATO of the USSR, taught by the bitter experience of 1941, developed its reciprocal plans in advance. As well as vice versa.

                      There is no abstract knowledge. Now NATO troops are pulling toward the borders of the Russian Federation, NATO strategists are feeling the defense and air defense systems. Conflicts at the borders, economic sanctions and direct threats. Is it time to launch a preemptive strike?

                      What conflicts on the border are you talking about? What are the direct threats? The only one of you that is in reality is the sanctions and the strengthening of NATO on the eastern borders. And even after them, when the political situation with Crimea was closest to the armed conflict, Russia began preparations for this most likely conflict.
                      1. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +3
                        22 June 2020 00: 52
                        Mobilization of troops is always an occasion for war. This was spelled out in all the charters and instructions of that time. You may not believe it, but it is.
                        Shelia reported incorrect data that were not confirmed. Have you read his information? The screen is on the website of the Ministry of Defense. I repeat - his data were not confirmed. And why did Stalin have to believe him?
                        Do you seriously think that preparation for war, the redeployment of units, the call of reservists is done according to one agent? And so avid for money that he was paid crazy at that time money.
                        I wrote to you - the Soviet leadership reacted to the threats. Messages about the concentration of German troops began in April 1941. Then in April, Stalin wrote a letter to Hitler asking him to explain this concentration. Believe it or not - it's all speculation. But then in April, the country's defense plan was developed and signed, which clearly stated that the main threat on the western borders. In May, covert mobilization took place, which allowed staffing border divisions of up to 10-12 thousand people. In May, Hess flew to England. In June, there were reports of the transfer of German tank divisions. On June 14 there was a TASS report and the advance of troops to the border began. The Deep Counties began nominating back in May.
                        What has not Stalin done yet?
                      2. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +2
                        22 June 2020 01: 18
                        From the beloved by many Rezun:

                        B.M. Shaposhnikov differs from all his predecessors only in that he expressed himself very clearly, briefly, categorically:
                        «Mobilization is not only a sign of war, but also war itself. The government’s order to declare mobilization is an actual declaration of war. ”

                        "In modern conditions, the mobilizing state must make a firm decision in advance about the conduct of the war."

                        "Under the general mobilization is understood such a fact when there can no longer be a return to a peaceful situation."

                        “We consider it expedient to mobilize only the general, as the strain of all the forces and means necessary to achieve victory.”

                        Whether this is so or not, one can argue. But Shaposhnikov was at that time an authority for Stalin. And his book "The Brain of the Army" was a reference for many officers. According to the views of that time, mobilization is a war.
                        -----------
                        Modernity. Try to put the Strategic Missile Forces into alertness and look at the reaction of the opposing side. What Putin said about Crimea is that we just have to take his word for it. But even if this is so, he does not say anything about the actions of the opposing side. And this is a very important factor.
                      3. Cyril
                        Cyril
                        -1
                        22 June 2020 01: 23
                        Mobilization of troops is always an occasion for war. This was spelled out in all the charters and instructions of that time. You may not believe it, but it is.

                        Good. Well, not mobilization, so even if the border was strengthened, the troop movement to the west and other preparatory measures could be done in advance? Not in May, but at least in February-March?

                        Do you seriously think that preparation for war, the redeployment of units, the call of reservists is done according to one agent?

                        So if one. We read on the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation:

                        From September 6, 1940 to June 16, 1941, the Corsican and the Petty Officer reported 30 times to Moscow that Germany was preparing for war against the Soviet Union.

                        Under the pseudonym "Foreman" in the NKGB resident was Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen. The pseudonym "Corsican" belonged to Arvid Harnak. The Schulze-Boysen-Harnack organization, which included anti-fascists fighting against Hitler and his Nazi government, repeatedly warned employees of the Soviet embassy in Berlin about the danger, which was steadily approaching the borders of the USSR from Germany.

                        The information included in the "List of reports on military training against the USSR for January - June 1941" are documents of exceptional importance. NKGB intelligence reports and Narkombat defense intelligence reports from different, independent from each other sources. They were supposed to expand the understanding of the leaders of the USSR about the degree of threat posed by fascist Germany.

                        The most important reports from the sources were sent by I.V. Stalin, Minister of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff K.A. Meretskov (1940 - end of January 1941) and G.K. Zhukov (end of January - July 1941).

                        In short, it’s easier for you to read here:

                        http://mil.ru/winner_may/history/more.htm?id=10674353@cmsArticle

                        There, the entire text literally cries out that the informing of the Soviet leadership by various sources began as early as September 1940.

                        Then in April, Stalin wrote a letter to Hitler asking him to explain this concentration. Believe it or not - it's all speculation.

                        The same article on the website of the Ministry of Defense says that, yes, he did. The successful campaign of disinformation about "Barbarossa" launched by the Germans during the preparation of the attack plan did its job.

                        What has not Stalin done yet?

                        He has not done this before. That is the main problem.
                      4. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +3
                        22 June 2020 08: 17
                        What you say has been done. And pumping troops on the western border, and training reservists. And the creation of new divisions. An increase in the Red Army from 3 to 5 million people. The creation of new tank structures pushed the boundaries. Increased arms release. What has not been done yet?
                        -----
                        Regarding intelligence reports. You choose those that work for your version and reject that which does not confirm it. Yes, on Stalin's desk lay a bunch of intelligence that the Germans were preparing an attack. But you forget that at the other end of the table was a no less weighty packet of documents that there would be no attack. Why did Stalin have to believe the corrupt agent Shelia and not believe the TASS representative in Berlin? And it was a professional intelligence officer who claimed that there would be no war. Why did Stalin have to believe the Germans and not believe the same Kobulov? Stalin did not believe intelligence reports, but real facts. Such facts appeared only in the spring of 1941 and the Soviet leadership responded adequately to them.
                        Intelligence data was inaccurate. The most accurate data was presented not by some Shelia, but by General Tupikov. But this is already April 1941.
                        ----
                        The problem is not that Stalin did not do this before. He simply physically could not do this. It was impossible to carry out mobilization, that is, to sharply increase the army to 10-11 million people, to snatch tens of thousands of cars and tractors from the national economy. I looked at the data. According to mobilization plans, 170 trucks had to be transferred to the army. And if the Germans do not attack? Hitler made the decision to attack the USSR after November 000. But even this did not mean the beginning of the war. Reading Halder's diary

                        At 13.00:21 on June 22 one of the following two signals will be transmitted to the troops: a) the Dortmund signal. It means that the offensive, as planned, will begin on June XNUMX and that it is possible to proceed to the open execution of orders; b) the signal "Altona". It means that the offensive is postponed for another term; but in this case it will already be necessary to fully disclose the goals of the concentration of German troops, since the latter will already be in full combat readiness.
                        June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive of the ground forces and the flight of aviation across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of aircraft, the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own.

                        Hitler made the final decision to attack the USSR at the last moment. The Altona signal could well have arrived.
                      5. Cyril
                        Cyril
                        -1
                        22 June 2020 09: 05
                        What you say has been done. And pumping troops on the western border, and training reservists. And the creation of new divisions. An increase in the Red Army from 3 to 5 million people. The creation of new tank structures pushed the boundaries. Increased arms release.

                        Then why are the results of the first year or two of the war?

                        Regarding intelligence reports. You choose those that work for your version and reject that which does not confirm it. Yes, on Stalin's desk lay a bunch of intelligence that the Germans were preparing an attack. But you forget that at the other end of the table was a no less weighty packet of documents that there would be no attack

                        Even if there were documents refuting the attack, the presence of data confirming it should have also been taken into account. They (confirmations) came from different sources, not only from the "corrupt von Shelia".

                        Hitler made the final decision to attack the USSR at the last moment. The signal from "Altona" could well have arrived

                        No not like this. Hitler made the decision to attack the USSR back in 40. The Altona signal did not cancel the attack itself - it only postponed it for another term.

                        It was impossible to carry out mobilization, that is, to sharply increase the army to 10-11 million people, to snatch tens of thousands of cars and tractors from the national economy.

                        So the fact of the matter is that mobilizing within six months and mobilizing within 1-2 months are two different things. We would start preparing earlier - the mobilization process would not be so extreme.

                        According to mobilization plans, 170 trucks had to be transferred to the army. And if the Germans do not attack?

                        What if they attack? You must admit that the damage from transferring the economy to military tracks and the mobilization of civilian equipment during an unjustified attack was in any case less than the damage from losses caused by the seizure of enemy land, the destruction of industry, and the massacre of soldiers and civilians.
                      6. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +3
                        22 June 2020 09: 13
                        The decision to attack the USSR was made in November 1940 after Molotov’s visit to Moscow. Planning is always there. I already said that I’m sure that the Pentagon has a plan of war against the Russian Federation. Also, as in the General Staff, there is a plan of war against the United States.
                        It is impossible to mobilize the army and keep it in combat condition for 6 months. And two months is impossible.
                        They will attack - they will not attack - this may be a fortune-telling girl. In addition to the seizure of millions of workers and tens of thousands of cars, this also means scrapping the entire railway transportation system. This is the transfer of the country to the rails of the military economy. And all this on the basis of several intelligence reports? Have you ever made decisions based on rumors?
                        You would mobilize in the place of Stalin, transfer the country to a total military regime and wait for an attack. Sorry, but this is not a serious conversation. It was impossible in principle. By the way, it was Stalin’s policy that made it possible to get allies. And most importantly - the archives of the United Kingdom remain in seven seals. And the significance of Hess's flight is still unknown.
                        We have already discussed enough. I do not consider your arguments convincing.
                      7. plabu
                        plabu
                        0
                        22 June 2020 15: 30
                        Bakhtiyar, you still DO NOT convince your opponents no matter how hard you try - well, their nature is such that so far they will not give a certificate, moreover, from Stalin, Hitler, Churchill and Roosevelt at the same time, with personal signature and seal of each - and the text something like - not overslept, they are unlikely to calm down, bully and for whatever reason - it’s of little interest to me. Either someone ordered them similar, or asked, or they don’t like the USSR and Stalin so much that they can’t eat directly - this, in my opinion, is not very interesting, these are their problems, especially since there are gaps in knowledge and history, and not only from them, well, just fall out of all the cracks ... negative
                        You and Boris recently discussed here, you haven’t come to a consensus, but never happen, given the time that has already passed, and if we recall Khrushchev’s efforts to whitewash himself and, conversely, yes and after the beginning of perestroika, how many there were those who strove to make money on it — some by selling documents, and some by falsifying them — one person from Mr. Volkogonov’s entourage told me that this was happening there, and on his command ...

                        Quote: Bakht
                        ... Try to put the Strategic Missile Forces on alert and look at the reaction of the opposing side. ....

                        The only correction to what you wrote earlier is that the example with the Strategic Missile Forces is not the most successful, it’s hardly worth deciphering the details, just take a word ...
                      8. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +2
                        22 June 2020 15: 48
                        Well, why? I will listen with pleasure about the Strategic Missile Forces. Moreover, I am sure that no one here knows the complete kitchen in this matter.
                        Everything else is clear and agree. This is not a cognitive gap. It was just "put in the head". At one time, I just read O. Tonina's articles and essays. What a "hellish blonde" can write is a masterpiece. And I like humor. She had an article about Manstein's tanks in Crimea. It's a classic.
                        To set the mood:

                        http://samlib.ru/t/tonina_o_i/brelki_03.shtml
                      9. plabu
                        plabu
                        0
                        22 June 2020 17: 19
                        Quote: Bakht
                        Well, why? I will listen with pleasure about the Strategic Missile Forces. Moreover, I am sure that no one here knows the complete kitchen in this matter.
                        Everything else is clear and agree. This is not a cognitive gap. It was just "put in the head". At one time, I just read O. Tonina's articles and essays. What a "hellish blonde" can write is a masterpiece. And I like humor. She had an article about Manstein's tanks in Crimea. It's a classic.
                        To set the mood:

                        http://samlib.ru/t/tonina_o_i/brelki_03.shtml

                        If you don’t mind, I’ll write about the Strategic Missile Forces in PM, and thanks for the reference, I’ll definitely read ...
                      10. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +1
                        22 June 2020 17: 27
                        Of course, I do not mind. I like new information.
              2. Bakht
                Bakht
                +3
                21 June 2020 10: 41
                I am not confusing anything. The general readiness for war is laid in the plans of the national economy. For example, now, in our time.
                Specific measures to repel aggression are carried out when the intentions of the enemy (partner) become quite obvious. This is June 14, 1941.
                -----
                Tell me. Today, American and Russian strategists regularly appear at the borders of states. Does this mean that right now it is necessary to raise troops on alarm and to launch Poplar and Yars?
                1. Cyril
                  Cyril
                  -1
                  21 June 2020 21: 14
                  Tell me. Today, American and Russian strategists regularly appear at the borders of states. Does this mean that right now it is necessary to raise troops on alarm and to launch Poplar and Yars?

                  Raise troops on alert and launch Poplar and Yars - no. But to concentrate forces on the probable directions of the enemy offensive, to strengthen the garrisons of the troops, to ensure their supply and to carry out other preparatory measures — is quite.
                  1. Bakht
                    Bakht
                    +2
                    21 June 2020 21: 59
                    Do you know the direction of the likely enemy attack? Stirlitz infiltrated the headquarters of Bock or Rundstedt? Even in 1943 on the Kursk Bulge could not accurately determine the direction of the main attacks.
                    Preparatory activities were carried out. Supply issues were decided as far as possible. You say general words that are not applicable to the real situation.
                    According to your logic, by the standards of the time, you are proposing to launch Topol.
                    1. Cyril
                      Cyril
                      -1
                      22 June 2020 00: 49
                      Do you know the direction of the likely enemy attack?

                      And intelligence for what? And forecasting for what? In the end, this is precisely the work of the military command - to lead the army not only after the start of the war, but also to plan, predict its course, and direct the main strikes before the war.

                      Preparatory activities were carried out,

                      So it was carried out that, for example, on June 22 the air defense troops were manned as in peacetime.

                      According to your logic, by the standards of the time, you are proposing to launch Topol.

                      If for you launching a military missile in another country is tantamount to strengthening the number of troops, pulling up on your own territory to your own borders - well, apparently, we have different ideas about the war, really.
                      1. Bakht
                        Bakht
                        +2
                        22 June 2020 00: 55
                        Very rarely, during the whole war, intelligence did not reveal the direction of the enemy’s main strike. You can count on the fingers of one hand.
                        Do you seriously think that the Soviet leadership should have predicted the attack on Minsk of two tank groups. You are laughing. Even in April, the names of the German commanders were inaccurate. You so believe in the omnipotence of intelligence that it becomes scary.
  5. Nikolai Miracles
    Nikolai Miracles
    +2
    20 June 2020 18: 02
    "Hostages of the 1941-1945 war."
    Yuri Stalgorov
    quote from:
    Part I. June-July 1941
    Chapter 1

    Since my stepfather was at the military training camp of the reserve commanders throughout April, he was asked to share his impressions with his grandmothers acquaintances - two former officers of the tsarist army. One of them was a colonel, the other a lower rank. They wanted to know how the senior lieutenant of the Red Army Wernikovsky assesses the situation on the border with Germany. My stepfather was fired to the reserve from the Red Army for some booze, but I never saw him drink alcohol or be drunk. Sitting on the veranda, they listened to his stories about Brest, where the training camp was held. It was interesting to me, and I listened carefully. According to Vernikovsky, Brest resembled a front-line city. The stepfather said that there are many Germans in civilian clothes in the city, and local residents say that the German army is behind the Bug and is about to enter the city. There are also many of our troops there, but there are also a lot of “stupidity”. So, for example, tankers from the division, standing near Brest, said that the tanks are without engines, since they were removed for major repairs. In Rogachev, residents also said that the war with Germany was about to begin, but wondered who would start it first - Stalin or Hitler. Therefore, in response to the statements of historians and pseudo-historians who claim that the war began unexpectedly for the population, I assert with full responsibility that this is not so. The war was expected, at least in eastern Belarus, where I lived at that time. And in Brest - even more so.

    https://mybook.ru/author/yurij-stalgorov/zalozhniki-vojny-19411945-gg/read/
  6. Observer2014
    Observer2014
    -3
    20 June 2020 21: 27
    Winners are not judged! Stalin won! Any objections?
    1. Bitter
      Bitter
      0
      21 June 2020 23: 17
      .... Any objections?

      For sure. Whether he overslept, or as some present the cut, is secondary. The Soviet people, led by Stalin, won that war, this is a historical fact. But all these discussions and condemnations of the leaders of that era on the part of contemporaries sometimes look like an attempt to shift all responsibility for the collapse of the power created by the victorious people onto long-dead individuals. And to today's "winners" - Yeltsin, Chubais and God knows who else, monuments, funds, temples, centers and privileges for themselves and relatives up to the seventeenth generation.
  7. Oleg Rambover
    Oleg Rambover
    -1
    20 June 2020 21: 31
    Quote: Alexander Neukropny
    Am I talking nonsense ?!

    Of course, for the respected Neukropny this is common.

    The proof of Stalin's genius is that in 1941 our country found itself face to face with the military forces of Germany, Italy, Romania, Hungary and others, but still not with the combined armed forces of ALL Europe.
    But his undoubted mistake was that the consequences of this reversal were calculated incorrectly. Stalin quite reasonably hoped that the Wehrmacht, even if it was locked on our borders, would be at least two or three years later, pretty battered by battles with millions of European armies.
    So in the end did it happen? And what bad plan was that?
    Yes ingenious! What the Supreme Personnel could not foresee was the fact that the “resistance” of German aggression will last in Europe for several hours, for several days, and for weeks.

    What about

    People who decide the fate of millions are either talented, or mediocre, or able to make the right decisions, or incapable of this.

    What is the genius of the plan, if it depends on the actions of forces not controlled by Stalin? Stalin miscalculated and lost 27 million Soviet citizens. Where is the respected Neukropny saw genius? That is, in September of the 39th year, he did not notice that his plan didn’t work and the war would be different, in May of the 40th he also did not suspect anything, and here the bang and June 22nd 41. For a genius, it took him too long.
    And yes, in September 39 the Wehrmacht was not the same as the Wehrmacht on June 22 41. Germany used these two years clearly better than the USSR.
    1. Bakht
      Bakht
      +5
      20 June 2020 21: 54
      Germany obviously used these two years better than the USSR.

      Hardly. The result showed that Germany used them not in the best way.
      1. Oleg Rambover
        Oleg Rambover
        -1
        20 June 2020 23: 36
        No, not unlikely. If it were not for the resources that Germany received in these two years, the Wehrmacht would not have reached the shadow of what it achieved in reality on the eastern front.
      2. Cyril
        Cyril
        -1
        21 June 2020 21: 15
        The result showed that Germany used them not in the best way.

        - not the best - maybe. But clearly better than the USSR.
        1. Bakht
          Bakht
          +1
          21 June 2020 21: 56
          Do you deny the outcome of the war?
          1. Cyril
            Cyril
            0
            22 June 2020 00: 21
            The result of the war did not depend entirely on pre-war preparations.
            1. Bakht
              Bakht
              +2
              22 June 2020 00: 36
              How depended. It is not sticks and stones to fight. War is won not only on the battlefield. But also in the rear. Preparations for war include industry.
              1. Cyril
                Cyril
                0
                22 June 2020 00: 55
                Read carefully. I wrote that the result of the war was not dependent whole from pre-war training. The quality of the pre-war preparation was shown not in 1945, but in 1941-42. Until 1945, there were still as many as 3 years. Over the 3 years, much has changed, a lot. For example, the Allies opened the Second Front - and this was not the result of this very pre-war preparation of the USSR. But the years 1941-42 - yes, the USSR almost completely pulled out the war with Germany on itself, not counting Lend-Lease supplies (although they helped a lot). By the way, Lend-Lease was also not the result of pre-war preparation.

                Many of the decisions that ultimately led to victory were not taken by the USSR in advance, but during the war. Solve problems as they become available.
                1. Bakht
                  Bakht
                  +2
                  22 June 2020 01: 00
                  We will not understand each other.
                  What is a triad division? They were the majority in the Red Army of 1939.
                  What is universal conscription? It was introduced in 1939. Unfortunately, she was not allowed to create a reserve of reservists. Did not have enough time.
                  What are NPP tanks? What was the reform of the tank forces?
                  This was all done during the years 1939-1941.
                  As I understand it, you are not interested in industry. In vain. What Liddell Garth considered a classic example of indirect action and what he called the main reason for the defeat of Germany.
                  I’m keeping silent about the Second Front. People fought. It is what it is. But by that time, little had changed. Lend-lease supplies helped, as Mikoyan said, reduce the war by two years. Substantial help - I will not argue. But not the main one.
  8. steelmaker
    steelmaker
    -2
    20 June 2020 22: 10
    There is surprisingly little talk about betrayal. But such a catastrophe, at the beginning of the war, without great betrayal is simply impossible! And treachery and sabotage at the highest level! I hardly heard any serious accusations against Stalin after June 22. The evacuation of defense enterprises was brilliantly carried out. And in general: "For Putin! For the Motherland!" Who will it scream? Even in a mental hospital you will not find such!
  9. Nikolay Malyugin
    Nikolay Malyugin
    +1
    21 June 2020 06: 33
    Who benefits from praising the leader to heaven? First of all, his surroundings. The halo of the hero of the civil war lay tight on Voroshilov, although the commander was responsible for the fate of the army. This interweaving of responsibility and merit has prevented us for many years. Stalin knew the power of the German army very well, and he knew the strength of the Red Army. He was very hindered by victorious reports on the strength of aviation. Already after the Finnish company, many military experts turned to the insufficient strength of defensive weapons. Voroshilov publicly called them defeatists. Even Zhukov in his memoirs could not hide his irritation in Voroshilov’s relationship. It’s hard for us to imagine that time. And specialists just need to understand this matter. Without any ideological coloring.
    1. Essex62
      Essex62
      +2
      21 June 2020 09: 42
      And without ideology it will not work. Civil did not end in the 20th of the last century. She is walking now, cold for now. In the minds and hearts.
  10. riwas
    riwas
    0
    21 June 2020 07: 28
    There is a documentary - "Who" screwed up "the beginning of the war?"



    So it clearly shows what Stalin knew, but our Armed Forces were too inertial, and Stalin was too cautious.
  11. Arkharov
    Arkharov
    0
    21 June 2020 19: 12
    Overslept - to say the least ...
  12. RedproSet78
    RedproSet78
    +1
    21 June 2020 20: 28
    And it’s better to rule out who wants to rule the world and in whose hands a chessboard has long been in control. Then it becomes clear - whoever pays, he also dances. And we are only figures on this board, only some figures are historically strong and kind, while others are vice versa.
  13. Alexzn
    Alexzn
    -1
    22 June 2020 08: 03
    And only Corporal Schicklgruber ...

    A person who writes this should not be allowed to publish anything. A person has neither historical education, nor education at all. History does not know about the existence of Corporal Schicklgruber. The article contains a set of "outlook from the gateway", the impression that there is no Internet, all materials on the history of the USSR are absent, and you can write anything that itches. Another stupid article by a popular author on the site.
    PS Did Stalin slept on June 22? Any doubts?
  14. Yuri Strukov
    Yuri Strukov
    +2
    22 July 2020 13: 49
    Thank you for the article. Everything is logical, one flows from the other. There is no subjunctive mood in history.